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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF INDIRECT 
EXPROPRIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENTS 
PETER D. ISAKOFF† 
ABSTRACT 
At present, arbitral tribunals have applied a variety of standards to ascertain 
when indirect expropriation occurs.  This article examines the complexities and 
ambiguities of current indirect expropriation standards and argues that a clear, 
uniform standard is needed to identify indirect expropriation.  Ultimately, this 
article proposes that arbitral tribunals should only find that indirect expropriation 
occurs when (i) a state takes actions that substantially deprive the foreign investor of 
the profitability of its investment, and (ii) the state action was not reasonably 
predictable to the investor.  Part I of this article provides a summary of the current 
state of expropriation doctrine.  Part II exposes the ambiguities of current indirect 
expropriation standards and outlines several potential solutions that scholars have 
proposed.  Part III offers a succinct, two-part standard for identifying compensable 
indirect expropriation claims.  Part IV applies this proposed standard to the recent 
PM Asia arbitration.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On November 21, 2011, the Australian Parliament passed the Tobacco Plain 
Packaging Act 2011,1 which bans trademarked logos from appearing on the 
packaging of tobacco products.2  That same day, Philip Morris Asia (“PM Asia”) 
filed a Notice of Arbitration against the Australian government.3  It claimed, under 
the Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”),4 that Australia’s plain 
packaging legislation amounted to an indirect expropriation of PM Asia’s 
intellectual property and good will.5   
PM Asia’s claim raises an important issue in international investment law: what 
exactly constitutes indirect expropriation?  While instances where a state forcibly 
nationalizes foreign investments present clear cases of direct expropriation, claims of 
indirect expropriation are inherently more nebulous.  At present, arbitral tribunals 
have applied a variety of standards to ascertain when indirect expropriation occurs.  
This article examines the complexities and ambiguities of current indirect 
expropriation standards and argues that a clear, uniform standard is needed to 
identify indirect expropriation.  Ultimately, this article proposes that arbitral 
tribunals should only find that indirect expropriation occurs when (i) a state takes 
actions that substantially deprive the foreign investor of the profitability of its 
investment, and (ii) the state action was not reasonably predictable to the investor.   
                                                          
 1 Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw. 
gov.au/Details/C2011B00128. 
 2 Alison Rourke, Australia Passes Plain packaging Cigarette Law, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 
10, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/10/australia-plain packaging-cigarette-
law. 
 3 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 
2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/PhilipMorrisAsiaLimited_v_Australia_ 
NOA_21Nov2011.pdf. 
 4 Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., Sep. 15, 1993, 1748 U.N.T.S. 
385, available at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/IPPAAustraliae.PDF. 
 5 Notice of Arbitration, supra note 3 at 1.5 (“Australia’s plain packaging legislation 
virtually eliminates Philip Morris’ branded business by expropriating its valuable intellectual 
property.”). 
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Part I of this article provides a summary of the current state of expropriation 
doctrine.  Part II exposes the ambiguities of current indirect expropriation standards 
and outlines several potential solutions that scholars have proposed.  Part III offers a 
succinct, two-part standard for identifying compensable indirect expropriation 
claims.  Part IV applies this proposed standard to the recent PM Asia arbitration.   
II. DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION: A GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Customary international law has long afforded states the authority to expropriate 
foreign investments, as long as the expropriation: (i) is for a public purpose; (ii) is 
non-discriminatory; (iii) complies with due process principles; and (iv) provides the 
investor with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.6  While the exact 
contours of expropriation doctrine are a matter of international treaties, including 
BITs,7 the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),8 the Energy Charter 
Treaty,9 and the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments,10 these treaties outline common principles of expropriation doctrine.11  
Generally, expropriation claims fall into two broad categories: direct expropriation 
and indirect expropriation.  Section A of this Part briefly outlines direct 
expropriation.  Section B examines the scope of non-compensable state police 
powers, and Section C explores various regulatory activities that could qualify as 
compensable indirect expropriation. 
A.  Direct Expropriation 
Cases of direct expropriation are usually readily identifiable12 and entail overt 
government taking of a foreign investment.13  Direct expropriation is usually open 
                                                          
 6 L. Yves Fortier & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of 
International Investment: I know it When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 13 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 
79, 81 (2005). 
 7 For an overview of expropriation sections of BITs, see CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC, 
LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: 
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 275–86 (2007). 
 8 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057 [hereinafter 
NAFTA], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/NAFTA/NAFTATCE.ASP. 
 9 Energy Charter Treaty,  Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100, available at 
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf. 
 10 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,  Dec. 15 1987, 27 
I.L.M. 612, available at http://www.aseansec.org/12812.htm. 
 11 See MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 7, at 268–69 (“[E]xpropriation 
provisions in treaties, though often similar, sometimes contain distinctions in wording.  These 
distinctions inevitably have provoked discussion as to whether, on the one hand, a substantive 
difference in meaning should be recognized or, on the other hand, an emphasis on small 
variations in language (English language) is a misguided approach to the understanding of 
international law.”). 
 12 See id. at 8.70 (“The determination of direct expropriation by courts and tribunals does 
not usually raise conceptual difficulties.”). 
 13 See id. at 8.69 (“[T]he central element [of direct expropriation] is that property must be 
‘taken’ by State authorities or the investor must be deprived of it by State authorities.”). 
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and deliberate, with the state engaging in outright seizure of foreign-owned facilities 
or mandating an obligatory transfer of title.   
Venezuela’s recent nationalizations within the oil industry represent prime 
examples of direct expropriation.  In May 2009, Venezuela’s National Assembly 
passed a law giving its government the authority to take over oil-service contractors, 
including American and British companies.14  President Chavez subsequently used 
the Venezuelan military to seize oil installations, and brought in oil workers from 
India, Libya, and Iran to operate the expropriated oil rigs and refineries.15  In recent 
years, Venezuela has further engaged in the direct expropriation of foreign-owned 
facilities in a wide range of industries, including steel mills, retail stores, cement-
making facilities, and glass-making facilities.16  At present, Venezuela faces more 
than a dozen pending expropriation cases under arbitration with the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).17 
Because cases of direct expropriation are usually unambiguous and easily 
identifiable,
 18 direct expropriation falls outside the scope of this article.  Instead, this 
article focuses on the nebulous standards for determining indirect expropriation. 
B.  State Police Powers 
Generally, states do not engage in compensable expropriation when they enact 
regulations that are “commonly accepted as within the police power of States” as 
long as the regulation “is not discriminatory . . .  and is not designed to cause the 
alien to abandon the property to the state or sell it at a distress price.”19  Therefore, 
states do not owe investors compensation for “loss of property or . . . other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, [and] forfeiture 
for crime.”20 
The arbitral decision in Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic21 elaborates on the 
scope of state police powers.  In Saluka Investments, the claimant acquired 36% of 
                                                          
 14 Martin Arostegui, Venezuelan Nationalization Continuing, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 
May 12, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/12/nationalization-
continuing/?page=all. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Chavez Orders Expropriation of Owens-Illinois, CBS NEWS (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-6991745.html 
 17 Venezuela and International Arbitration: Ick-SID, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/01/venezuela-and-international-
arbitration. 
 18 See Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6, at 290 (“Arbitral tribunals have considered direct 
expropriation as being relatively easy to recognize: for example, government authorities take 
over a mine or factory, depriving the investor of all meaningful benefits of ownership and 
control, or there has been a compulsory transfer of property rights.” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)). 
 19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. § 712 comment g (1987). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Mar. 17, 
2006), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award% 
20170306.pdf. 
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one of the four major state-owned banks in the Czech Republic during the bank 
privatization process that occurred in the aftermath of the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia.22  The claimant’s bank did not receive state subsidies given to the 
other three major banks,23 and the bank was consequently forced into receivership.24  
As the Czech Republic described, the claimant’s bank had failed to comply with 
domestic banking regulations and “endangered the stability of the banking system.”25  
Here, the tribunal found that the Czech Republic acted within state police powers, 
and thus did not owe compensation, because it sought through regulation to promote 
financial stability.26 
Arbitral tribunals have struggled to distinguish state police powers from 
compensable expropriation, especially indirect expropriation.27  As the Saluka 
Investments tribunal noted, “international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive 
and definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered ‘permissible’ and 
‘commonly accepted’ as falling within the police or regulatory power of States and, 
thus, non-compensable.”28  Instead, tribunals have taken an ad hoc approach to 
identifying indirect expropriation. 
C.  Indirect Expropriation 
State regulatory action can sometimes transcend police powers and rise to the 
level of indirect expropriation.  Nonetheless, arbitral tribunals have faced practical 
difficulties in distinguishing between non-compensable regulation and compensable 
indirect expropriation.29  This Section explores several different types of state actions 
that can potentially constitute indirect expropriation. 
1.  Measures Tantamount to Expropriation 
The expropriation provisions of many BITs and other international investment 
treaties reference measures “tantamount to” or “equivalent to” expropriation.30  This 
                                                          
 22 Id. ¶ 62. 
 23 Id. ¶ 82. 
 24 Id. ¶ 136. 
 25 Id. ¶ 270. 
 26 Id. ¶ 276. 
 27 Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6, at 299. 
 28 Saluka Investments, supra note 21, ¶ 263. 
 29 Id. ¶ 293. 
 30 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 8, at art. 1110.1 (“No party may . . . take a measure 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment.”); Treaty Between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 4(2), Oct. 18, 2001, I.C.-B.T. 037  
(“Investments by investors of either Contracting State shall not be . . . subject to any other 
measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation.”); Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 5, U.K.–Sierra Leone, Jan. 13, 2000, U.K. 
Foreign & Commonwealth Off. Treaty Series No. 17 (“Investments of nationals or companies 
of either Contracting Party shall not be . . . subjected to measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalisation or expropriation.”). 
194 GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:2 
 
language has often been narrowly construed to avoid expanding the definition of 
expropriation; rather, it is simply meant to include expropriations that occur in 
substance but not in form.31  In fact, some arbitral tribunals have treated “measures 
tantamount to expropriation” as the functional equivalent of expropriation.32 
The arbitral decision in S.D. Meyers v. Canada33 provides a clear analysis of the 
definition of “measures tantamount to expropriation.”  In S.D. Meyers, the American 
claimant operated a PCB hazardous waste treatment and disposal business in 
Canada.34  After Canada passed a law banning the exportation of PCB waste,35 the 
claimant alleged that this constituted a measure tantamount to expropriation since the 
claimant’s business transported PCB waste from Canada to its Ohio facilities for 
treatment and disposal.  In its expropriation analysis, the S.D. Meyers tribunal stated 
that “[t]he primary meaning of the word ‘tantamount’ given by the Oxford English 
Dictionary is ‘equivalent.’  Both words require a Tribunal to look at the substance of 
what has occurred and not only at form. . . . [S]omething that is ‘equivalent’ to 
something else cannot logically encompass more. . . . [T]he drafters of the NAFTA 
[did not intend to] expand the internationally accepted scope of the term 
expropriation.”36  Ultimately, the S.D. Meyers did not find that indirect expropriation 
occurred. 
2.  Regulatory Takings 
Arbitrators have frequently found that state regulatory measures can transcend 
the scope of state police power to constitute compensable expropriation.  In this 
regard, some tribunals have effectively exported to the international arena a doctrine 
similar to U.S. “regulatory takings” jurisprudence.37   
For instance, in Link Trading v. Republic of Moldova,38 the claimant imported 
consumer products into a “free economic zone” (“FEZ”) in Moldova, where it was 
initially exempt from import duties and taxes.39  After Moldova later passed a law 
                                                          
 31 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, First Partial Award, 
¶ 285 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408, available at http://italaw.com/documents/ 
PartialAward_Myers_000.pdf (“The primary meaning of the word ‘tantamount’ given by the 
Oxford English Dictionary is ‘equivalent.’ Both words require a tribunal to look at the 
substance of what has occurred and not only the form.”). 
 32 Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of the 
Tribunal (Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICISD Rep. 341, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC587_En&caseI
d=C175. 
 33 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, supra note 31, at ¶ 142. 
 34 Id. ¶ 93. 
 35 Id. ¶ 123. 
 36 Id. ¶ 286. 
 37 Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment 
International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 NYU L. REV. 30, 37 (2003). 
 38 Link Trading v. Republic of Moldova, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Apr. 18, 2002), 
available at http://italaw.com/documents/Link-Trading-Moldova.pdf.  
 39 Id. ¶¶ 1–3. 
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requiring companies in the FEZ to collect taxes from customers at the point of sale,40 
Link Trading raised an expropriation claim.  The Link Trading tribunal, in its 
expropriation analysis, stated that regulatory measures “become expropriatory when 
they are found to be an abusive taking.  Abuse rises where it is demonstrated that the 
state has acted unfairly or inequitably toward the investment, where it has adopted 
measures that are arbitrary or discriminatory in character or in their manner of 
implementation, or where the measures taken violate an obligation undertaken by the 
state in regard to the investment.”41  Under this analysis, the tribunal found that no 
regulatory taking occurred.42 
Some scholars argue that international tribunals have inappropriately expanded 
this doctrine beyond the scope of U.S. “regulatory takings” jurisprudence.43  For 
instance, arbitral tribunals sometimes apply a more expansive definition of 
“property” than under U.S. domestic law.44  Furthermore, although U.S. courts have 
held that changes in common law are not regulatory takings, some tribunals have 
found that the actions of a state’s courts can constitute expropriation of a foreign 
investment.45  Additionally, the procedural mechanisms of international arbitration 
may provide advantages to investors that are not available in domestic U.S. 
litigation.46 
3.  Creeping Expropriation 
Indirect expropriation does not necessarily occur through a single state action; 
instead, it can be the result of a progression of regulatory measures.  Even if a 
particular part of this progression would not independently constitute expropriation, 
the aggregate effect of such measures could eventually rise to the level of 
expropriation.47  Generally, creeping expropriation occurs when a state seeks to 
                                                          
 40 Id. ¶6. 
 41 Id. ¶ 64. 
 42 Id. ¶ A. 
 43 See Been & Beauvais, supra note 37 at 37 (“Although many have argued that NAFTA 
simply ‘exports’ the U.S. regulatory takings standard into international  law, we demonstrate 
that, in fact, the NAFTA tribunal decisions and dicta significantly exceed U.S. takings 
protections (already among the most protective in the world) in several respects.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 44 Id. at 59. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 59–60. 
 47 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/96/1, Award of the Tribunal (Feb. 17, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 153, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docId=DC539_En&caseId=C152; see also Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/9, Award, ¶ 20.22 (Sep. 16, 2003), available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/GenerationUkraine_000.pdf  (“Creeping expropriation is a form 
of indirect expropriation with a distinctive temporal quality in the sense that it encapsulates 
the situation whereby a series of acts attributable to the State over a period of time culminate 
in the expropriatory taking of such property.”). 
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accomplish the same result as direct expropriation through regulatory measures 
extending over a period of time.48 
For instance, the tribunal in Feldman v. Mexico49 analyzed whether tax 
regulations constituted creeping expropriation.  In Feldman, the American claimant 
operated a cigarette resale business in Mexico.50  The Mexican government passed 
an excise tax on cigarettes, but after pressure from domestic cigarette producers, 
later amended the tax to provide rebates to cigarette producers, but not resellers like 
the claimant.51  After litigation in Mexican courts, the claimant received rebates for 
several years,52 but the Mexican government later reinstated its prohibition on 
rebates to resellers and required the claimant to repay the approximately $25 million 
of rebates he had received.53   
In Feldman, the claimant alleged that the series of tax regulations and reforms 
constituted creeping expropriation because they sought “to achieve the same result 
[as an outright taking] by taxation and regulatory measures designed to make 
continued operation of a project uneconomical so that it is abandoned.”54  The 
Feldman tribunal declined to find that creeping expropriation occurred, because: (i) 
ordinary business issues do not constitute expropriation; (ii) NAFTA and customary 
international law do not require states to permit the exports of cigarettes; (iii) at no 
point did the tax regulation in question guarantee cigarette resellers the “right” to 
export cigarettes; and (iv) the claimant’s investment always remained in his 
control.55 
III.  THE AMBIGUITY OF CURRENT STANDARDS FOR INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
At a broad level, “[t]he concept of expropriation is reasonably clear: it is a 
governmental taking of property for which compensation is required.”56  
Nonetheless, as the previous Part demonstrates, in practice the breadth of potential 
state actions that could constitute indirect expropriation presents significant line-
drawing issues, and international treaties provide little guidance in making these 
close determinations.57  Given this doctrinal void, arbitral tribunals have taken a 
variety of approaches to determine when exactly a state’s actions constitute indirect 
                                                          
 48 See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 49 Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of the 
Tribunal (Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICISD Rep. 341, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC587_En&caseI
d=C175. 
 50 Id. ¶ 9. 
 51 Id. ¶¶ 7–10. 
 52 Id. ¶ 19. 
 53 Id. ¶ 21. 
 54 Id. ¶ 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 55 Id. ¶ 111. 
 56 MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 7, at 266. 
 57 Id. at 267. 
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expropriation as opposed to non-compensable regulation.58  Section A of this Part 
examines various standards that arbitral tribunals have applied to identify indirect 
expropriation.  Section B looks at two potential alternatives to indirect expropriation 
doctrine. 
A.  Arbitral Standards for Determining Indirect Expropriation 
Scholars have classified the various standards used by arbitral tribunals to 
identify indirect expropriation into two general categories: (i) analysis of the effect 
of the state action on the investor, and (ii) analysis of the purpose of the state 
action.59  Within these two categories, tribunals’ rationale has varied greatly. 
1.  Effect on the Investor 
Almost every tribunal examines the effect of a state action on the investor when 
determining whether an investment has occurred.  Generally, the leading 
Restatement on the subject provides a broad test: “[a] state is responsible as for an 
expropriation of property . . . when it . . . unreasonably interferes with, or unduly 
delays, effective enjoyment of an alien’s property.”60  
Tribunals have applied numerous variations of this test.61  For example, in 
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States,62 the tribunal 
stated that indirect expropriation occurs when the investor is “radically deprived of 
the economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto . 
. . had ceased to exist.”63  In Pope & Talbot v. Canada,64 the tribunal provided that 
“the test is whether that interference is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion 
that the property has been ‘taken’ from its owner.”65  The tribunal in Starrett 
                                                          
 58 See id. (“The definitions of expropriation appearing in investment treaties are of such a 
generality that they provide little guidance to parties or arbitral tribunals confronted by 
concrete cases.  In the absence of firm guidance, arbitral tribunals have fashioned a variety of 
tests for assessing whether States are liable for expropriation, which can create both 
opportunities and uncertainties for parties in circumstances where expropriation arguably has 
occurred.”). 
 59 See generally, e.g. Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6, at 300-17 (providing a detailed 
analysis of various arbitral standards for determining when indirect expropriation has 
occurred). 
 60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S., supra note 19, at § 712 
comment g. 
 61 For an even more extensive list of various standards applied by tribunals, see Fortier & 
Drymer, supra note 6, at 300–06. 
 62 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docId=DC602_En&caseId=C186. 
 63 Id. ¶ 115.   
 64 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Interim Award (June 26, 
2000), 7 ICSID Rep. 69, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/ 
Pope/PopeInterimMeritsAward.pdf. 
 65 Id. ¶ 102. 
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Housing Corp. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran66 formulated the test as 
interference where investors’ “rights are rendered so useless that they must be 
deemed to have been expropriated.”67  In Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA,68 the tribunal 
stated that indirect expropriation occurred when the investor “was deprived of 
fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that the deprivation is not merely 
ephemeral.”69  Although some scholars argue that all of these standards are 
formulations of an overarching “substantial deprivation” standard,70 the decisions of 
these various tribunals suggests otherwise.  In practice, it appears these tests all 
contain distinct aspects and are in need of harmonization. 
Tribunals also disagree regarding the temporal aspects of compensable indirect 
expropriation.  For instance, the Tecmed tribunal held that state action constitutes an 
indirect expropriation when it is “irreversible and permanent.”71  Conversely, in 
Wena Hotels, the tribunal found that the temporary seizure of hotels for one year 
constituted an expropriation.72  The decisions of tribunals further diverge as to 
whether the state action must deprive the investor of the whole investment, or just a 
part of the investment.  The S.D. Meyers tribunal found that an expropriation could 
occur even when the state action deprived the investor of only part of its 
investment.73  On the other hand, the Iurii Bogdanov tribunal required deprivation of 
“the totality or a substantial part of the investment” in order to find compensable 
indirect expropriation.74   
Some tribunals, utilizing the “sole effects” test, exclusively examine whether the 
effect of the government’s action was to deprive the investor in whole or significant 
part of the economic benefits of its investment.75  Since, at least in theory, almost 
                                                          
 66 Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Gov’t of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Ck. Trib. Rep. 
122 (1983). 
 67 Id. at 1115. 
 68 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 6 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219 (1984) 
 69 Id. at 222. 
 70 See Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6, at 306 (“It is arguable that these seemingly 
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¶ 131 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002), available at http://italaw.com/documents/Wena-
2000-Final.pdf. 
 73 S.D. Meyers, supra note 31, at ¶ 283 (“[I]t would be appropriate to view a deprivation as 
amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.”). 
 74 Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd. and Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of 
Moldova, SCC, Arbitral Award, ¶ 4.2.5 (Sep. 22, 2005), available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/Bogdanov-Moldova-22September2005.pdf. 
 75 See Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 
64, 79-80 (2002) (“What is much more controversial, however, is the question of whether the 
focus on the effect will be the only and exclusive relevant criterion (“sole effect doctrine”), or 
whether the purpose and the context of the governmental measure may also enter into the 
 
2013] DEFINING THE SCOPE OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 199 
 
any government expropriation is for a public purpose, proponents of the “sole effect” 
test posit that the purpose of the government action should not be taken into account 
in expropriation analysis.76  In practice, this leads to an extremely investor-friendly 
policy.  Instead, tribunals should provide some level of additional analysis to 
distinguish indirect expropriation cases from non-compensable regulation.77 
2.  Purpose of the State Action 
In lieu of the “sole effect” test, many arbitral tribunals apply a broader standard 
by examining the purpose of a government action in addition to its effects on an 
investor.  This type of analysis allows arbitrators to take a subjective case-by-case 
approach, which some scholars believe leads to more custom-tailored decisions.78 
Some arbitral tribunals, such as the tribunal in Eudoro A. Olguín v. Republic of 
Paraguay,79 examine whether the purpose of the alleged expropriation was the 
enrichment of the host state.80  Nonetheless, this standard is overly inclusive, since 
almost any state regulatory action could be construed as enriching the host state.  
Other tribunals, like the tribunal in Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Iran,81 have analyzed 
whether the government deliberately targeted the investor.82  This would put an 
inordinate burden on the claimant to prove that a state acted to deliberately interfere 
with its operations.  State regulatory actions usually at least span across an industry, 
without targeting a specific investor, so this standard would not recognize many 
legitimate indirect expropriation claims.  Despite the decisions of the Olguín and 
                                                          
takings analysis.”); Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6 at 308 (“[S]ome authorities posit that an 
analysis, or test, of the effect (whether on the investment or the investor) of a governmental 
measure is all that is required to distinguish regulatory from indirect expropriatory state 
conduct: a purported regulation becomes an effective expropriation when it interferes unduly 
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investment.”). 
 76 Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6 at 309. 
 77 Part III.B. of this article provides such a solution by proposing that arbitral tribunals 
analyze both the effect of a state action on the investor and whether a reasonable investor 
could have predicted such state action. 
 78 See Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6, at 313–14 (“Proponents of this theory consider the 
governmental measure that is the object of the investor’s challenge in a contextual framework 
that allows, indeed requires, a weighing and balancing of factors including the purpose as well 
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 79 Eudoro A. Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Award (July 
26, 2001), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC575_En&caseId=C171. 
 80 Id. ¶ 84. 
 81 Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984). 
 82 Id. at 166 (“A finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the Tribunal 
be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental interference with the conduct of Sea-
Land’s operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and benefit of its 
investment.”). 
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Sea-Land Service tribunals, other arbitral tribunals have appropriately avoided 
applying these variations of the “purpose” standard.83 
More often, tribunals examine whether a state action promotes the general 
welfare.84  Still, since this type of analysis could overlap extensively with state police 
powers,85 its usefulness is limited.  Some scholars propose that this analysis could 
allow regulatory actions beyond the scope of state police powers, as long as they 
have a strong public welfare purpose.86  Still, a complete deprivation of property 
rights would constitute direct expropriation under this standard.87  Some tribunals, 
such as the tribunal in Tecmed, have engaged in a proportionality analysis, balancing 
the public welfare purpose of the state action with its effect on the investor.88  If the 
effect of the action on the investor is proportional to the public interest protected, 
these tribunals have found that no compensable expropriation occurred.89 
Overall, tribunals have taken a wide array of approaches to identify instances of 
indirect expropriation.  While some scholars may argue this provides a flexible 
approach, it also creates a great deal of uncertainty and may inappropriately 
categorize some legitimate state actions as indirect expropriation.  
B.  Alternatives to Indirect Expropriation 
1.  An End to Indirect Expropriation? 
Some scholars take a radical approach to resolving the ambiguity of indirect 
expropriation doctrine by proposing that only direct expropriation, involving the 
“physical invasion or seizure of property, nationalization, or governmental 
assumption or transfer of control over property,”90 should be compensable as 
expropriation. 
This drastic limitation of expropriation doctrine may have several concrete 
advantages.  First, it could avoid providing foreign companies with an advantage as 
                                                          
 83 Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6 at 317 (“In sum, the approaches adopted in Olguín v. 
Paraguay and by the majority in Sea-Land v. Iran do not seem to reflect the norm.  Neither 
the deliberate targeting of a particular investor nor the objective of enriching the State are 
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 85 See supra Part I.A. 
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 87 Fortier & Drymer, supra note 6, at 319. 
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 89 Id. 
 90 Been & Beauvais, supra note 37, at 129. 
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compared to their domestic counterparts.91  If a regulation is applied to both foreign 
and domestic companies, indirect expropriation doctrine provides foreign investors 
with an avenue for seeking compensation that is unavailable to domestic companies.  
Although this may incentivize foreign investment in developing countries, the same 
incentives could be created by providing foreign investors with favorable contractual 
terms rather than through the procedural advantages of investor-state arbitration.  
Limiting compensation to direct expropriation claims could allow states to 
implement beneficial public welfare regulations, such as environmental or health 
reforms, without the fear of indirect expropriation claims from foreign investors.92  
Nonetheless, eliminating indirect expropriation claims altogether may overreach in 
pursuit of this goal.  Investors sometimes have genuine indirect expropriation claims 
that merit compensation.  An ideal expropriation standard would effectively 
delineate between non-compensable state regulatory actions and legitimate indirect 
expropriation claims. 
Furthermore, since national governments compensate investors for expropriation 
claims, rather than the specific state, local, or federal agency responsible for the 
expropriation, some scholars note that indirect expropriation shifts the balance of 
power within a nation’s political system.93  Specifically, national governments may 
either require the agency responsible for the expropriation to internalize the cost of 
the expropriation award, or they may seek to restrict the scope of the agency’s 
actions to prevent future expropriation liability.94  Nonetheless, this argument is 
subject to several critiques.  First, imposing the costs of an expropriation award on 
the responsible agency, or limiting the agency’s expropriatory ability, may curb 
agencies that act outside the scope of their authority.  Furthermore, if indirect 
expropriation doctrine is construed narrowly, the power-shifting effects of the 
doctrine within a state’s government would be limited. 
Overall, ending indirect expropriation altogether would have numerous negative 
externalities and overreaches as a solution to the ambiguities of current indirect 
expropriation standards.  Some state actions amount to compensable indirect 
expropriation, and arbitrators should utilize a clear standard to delineate between 
non-compensable regulation and compensable indirect expropriation. 
2.  Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Most multilateral investment treaties and BITs provide for the fair and equitable 
treatment of foreign investors.95  In recent years, tribunals have increasingly 
recognized actionable “fair and equitable treatment” claims.96  This presents an 
intriguing question of whether “fair and equitable treatment” claims could, or should, 
take the place of indirect expropriation claims. 
                                                          
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. at 132. 
 93 Id. at 91, 135. 
 94 Id. at 135. 
 95 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1105.1 (“Each Party shall accord to investments of 
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security.”). 
 96 MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 7, at 201. 
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“Fair and equitable treatment” extends beyond mere equality between domestic 
companies and foreign investors, a principle that is more explicitly represented in 
national treatment clauses and most-favored-nation (“MFN”) clauses.97  Rather, “fair 
and equitable treatment” embodies “a standard of justice, very simple, very 
fundamental, and of such general acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a 
part of the international law of the world.”98  In this regard, it sets a minimum level 
of due process that all foreign investors should receive.99  Given the broad, 
encompassing nature of such language, it has been subject to significant 
interpretation by arbitral tribunals. 
Despite the fundamental similarities between “fair and equitable treatment” 
clauses and expropriation clauses in international investment treaties, “fair and 
equitable treatment” is not a viable independent alternative to a succinct indirect 
expropriation doctrine.  In the international investment context, “fair and equitable 
treatment” clauses serve a supplemental role: “the purpose of the clause as used in 
BIT practice is to fill gaps which may be left by the more specific standards, in order 
to obtain the level of investor protection intended by the treaties.”100  Although “[t]he 
generality of the clause easily lends itself to an expansive view of its reach extending 
to all corners and aspects of an investment setting,” “it is obvious that the clause is 
not meant to supplant or replace all other segments of an investment treaty.”101   
Thus, a clearly-defined standard for indirect expropriation is still needed.  “Fair 
and equitable treatment” clauses in multilateral investment treaties and BITs are only 
intended to supplement expropriation standards. 
IV.  DEVELOPING A UNIFORM STANDARD FOR INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION ANALYSIS 
As demonstrated in Part II of this article, the investment arbitration system 
requires a clear standard for determining when indirect expropriation occurs.  Part III 
offers such a standard through a two-part test.  Arbitral tribunals should only find 
that indirect expropriation occurs when (i) state actions substantially deprive a 
foreign investor of the economic use and enjoyment of its investment, and (ii) the 
state action was not reasonably predictable to the investor. 
A.  Substantial Deprivation 
As previously discussed, arbitral tribunals have taken a wide array of approaches 
in delineating between non-compensable regulation and compensable indirect 
expropriation.102  This has led to significant uncertainty and highlights the need for a 
uniform standard.  This article proposes, as the first part of a two-part test, that 
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 98 Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 
521–22 (1910). 
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tribunals should only recognize indirect expropriation claims when government 
action substantially deprives the investor of economic use and enjoyment of its 
investment.  
This standard follows the analysis of tribunals such as the tribunal in Pope & 
Talbot v. Canada.  In Pope & Talbot, a U.S. lumber corporation brought an 
expropriation claim against Canada under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.103  Pope & Talbot 
owned a wood products company incorporated in Canada that harvested timber to 
produce softwood lumber.104  As a result of the Softwood Lumber Agreement, a 
treaty between Canada and the U.S., Canada adopted the Canadian Export Control 
Regime, which imposed a fee on lumber exports in excess of statutory levels.105  
Here, the arbitral tribunal ruled for Canada, finding that the regulation did not result 
in a “substantial deprivation” of Pope & Talbot’s business interests because the 
limitations on exports did not interfere with the management or operations of Pope 
& Talbot’s investment.106  In short, a mere reduction in profits does not rise to the 
level of expropriation because it is not a “substantial deprivation” of the investor’s 
use and enjoyment of the investment.107 
Later tribunals, such as the tribunal in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. 
United Mexican States, have applied the same analysis as the Pope & Talbot 
tribunal.108  In Tecmed, the Spanish claimant purchased hazardous industrial waste 
landfill in Sonora, Mexico.109  Although the claimant was initially granted an 
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operating license by the Mexican government, renewal of the license was denied, 
and the government took actions to close the landfill.110  In its expropriation analysis, 
the tribunal examined whether Tecmed “was radically deprived of the economical 
use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto—such as the 
income or benefits related to the Landfill or to its exploitation—had ceased to exist.”  
Ultimately, the tribunal found that compensable expropriation had occurred.111 
Both Pope & Talbot and Tecmed suggest that while a mere reduction in profit-
making ability does not amount to expropriation, regulations that completely defeat 
the profit-making ability of an investment constitute compensable indirect 
expropriation.  Thus, “substantial deprivation” of the use and enjoyment of an 
investment entails complete neutralization of the profit-making ability of the 
investment.   
B.  Expectations of the Investor 
If an expropriation claim amounts to a “substantial deprivation” of the economic 
use and enjoyment of an investment, tribunals should next consider whether the state 
action was reasonably predictable to the investor.  As scholars have noted, 
“investment protection is not an insurance policy, and international tribunals have 
often reminded investors that they bear the normal risks associated with conducting a 
business.”112  Some arbitral tribunals have already begun to apply this type of 
analysis to indirect expropriation cases. 
For instance, the arbitral tribunal in Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States113 
applied such a standard in a case factually similar to Tecmed.  In Metalclad, the 
claimant purchased a transfer station for hazardous waste in San Luis Potosi, Mexico 
with the intent of constructing a hazardous waste landfill.114  The proposed project 
had already received a federal construction permit, and Metalclad obtained a state 
construction permit shortly after the purchase.115  Furthermore, Metalclad received 
assurances from federal agents that all necessary permits had been acquired.116  After 
construction of the landfill had begun, the local government ordered its cessation 
since Metalclad had not obtained a municipal construction permit.117  Federal agents 
assured Metalclad that if it applied for a municipal permit, it would receive the 
necessary authorization.118  Metalclad applied for the municipal permit and 
completed construction, but was denied the municipal permit thirteen months after 
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its application.119  Metalclad was prevented from operating the landfill, and the state 
governor later declared the surrounding land a Natural Area for the protection of a 
rare cactus, eliminating the possibility of Metalclad operating its facilities.120 
Here, the tribunal found that Mexico had indirectly expropriated Metalclad’s 
investment because it “depriv[ed] the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the 
use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property.”121  In its decision, 
the tribunal focused on, inter alia, Metalclad’s reasonable reliance on the assurances 
of the Mexican federal government.122  Because Metalclad engaged in extensive due 
diligence by consulting with federal and state authorities, it reasonably expected to 
be able to construct and operate the landfill.  Absent these assurances, the arbitration 
may have resulted in a different outcome. 
Implementing a standard based on whether a regulatory action is reasonably 
predictable or expected would result in several positive externalities.  First, it would 
protect investors who pursue opportunities in traditionally investor-friendly 
countries.123  In that instance, investors would have a reasonable presumption against 
indirect expropriation.  Additionally, the proposed standard encourages due diligence 
for foreign investments.  In Metalclad, the claimant obtained regulatory assurances 
from the Governor of San Luis Potosi, the President of the National Ecological 
Institute (a federal sub-agency responsible for federal permits), and the General 
Director of the Mexican Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology, among 
others.124   Foreign investors who engage in little or no due diligence should not 
receive compensation when reasonable due diligence would have exposed a risk of 
indirect expropriation. 
If due diligence reveals a risk of indirect expropriation, foreign investors can still 
rely on other risk mitigation measures, such as private insurance.  In recent decades, 
a market has emerged for private insurance against political risks like 
expropriation.125  Investors could also seek insurance from U.S. agencies such as the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), or international agencies such as 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”).126  Regardless of whether 
foreign investors opt to pursue such risk mitigation measures, they could still receive 
compensation for indirect expropriation under the proposed standard if the state 
action was not reasonably predictable after due diligence.  
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A potential issue with this proposed standard is that reasonable expectations of 
indirect expropriation could change over the course of the investment. For instance, 
a foreign investor may initially reasonably determine that no indirect expropriation 
risk exists, but recognize the emergence of the risk years later due to changes in the 
political climate.  Tribunals could pursue two options in this instance.  First, they 
could engage in an apportionment analysis, and determine what portion of the 
investment was made before the risk emerged.  Nonetheless, this could prove 
exceedingly complex in implementation.  Instead, tribunals could recognize that 
regulatory policy changes are a standard business risk, and focus on the reasonable 
expectations of the investor at the point of investment.  This would incentivize 
investors to either obtain government assurances before investing, like the claimant 
in Metalclad,127 or seek other risk mitigation measures such as private insurance.  
V.  APPLYING THE PROPOSED STANDARD: A CASE STUDY 
The two-part standard suggested in Part III provides a clear framework for 
identifying compensable indirect expropriation.  Part IV now analyzes how this 
standard could be applied to the recent arbitration filed by PM Asia against 
Australia.  Under the proposed standard, Australia’s plain packaging legislation 
would likely not be considered an indirect expropriation. 
A.  No Substantial Deprivation 
Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 likely does not substantially 
deprive PM Asia of the economic use and enjoyment of its investment in Australia.  
As the tribunals in Pope & Talbot and Tecmed suggest,128 analysis of this standard 
would depend on whether the plain packaging legislation completely defeats PM 
Asia’s profit-making ability in Australia. 
PM Asia first contends that the plain packaging legislation deprives it of the 
value of its shares since their value is “heavily dependent upon the ability to use the 
intellectual property on or in relation to tobacco products and packaging.”129  
Furthermore, PM Asia also argues that it has been deprived of its “intellectual 
property and the good will derived from the use of that intellectual property.”130  
Despite these claims, PM Asia likely has not been completely deprived of its profit-
making ability in Australia. 
Although the plain packing legislation interferes with PM Asia’s use of its 
trademarked logo,131  PM Asia’s trademark and other intellectual property are only 
part of the scope of the investment in Australia.  Since PM Asia can still sell tobacco 
products in Australia, it likely has not been completely deprived of its profit-making 
ability.  PM Asia’s strongest argument for indirect expropriation under the proposed 
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 128 See supra Part III.A. 
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standard would be that its sales in Australia will fall below the point of any 
profitability.  In fact, PM Asia has offered this argument in its preliminary Notice of 
Claim.132  The success of this claim, although dubious, would depend on expert 
analysis of the cigarette market in Australia.  Specifically, the parties would likely 
offer expert opinions regarding the extent to which trademarks and branding impact 
tobacco sales.  
B.  Reasonable Expectation of Regulations 
Even if PM Asia is able to prove that the plain packaging legislation neutralizes 
any profitability of its operations in Australia, it would likely lose on the second part 
of the proposed standard since it could have reasonably predicted that Australia 
would pass regulations similar to the plain packaging legislation.   
Generally, regulations regarding the sale of tobacco products are commonplace 
among developed nations.133  Furthermore, although Australia is the first country to 
implement plain packaging legislation, the concept has a long-standing background.  
The Toxic Substances Board of New Zealand’s Health Department first 
recommended plain packaging for cigarettes in 1989.134  Additionally, a Canadian 
parliamentary committee recommended its legislature pass plain packaging 
legislation in 1994.135  In 2010, the European Commission proposed a revision to 
Directive 2001/37/EC that would include plain packaging requirements,136 and in 
recent years similar proposals have occurred in France,137 Turkey,138 and the United 
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Kingdom,139 among other nations.  Overall, the international community has 
displayed a trend toward plain packaging legislation, and tobacco companies like 
PM Asia should recognize this as an ordinary business risk. 
PM Asia’s strongest argument for indirect expropriation under this part of the 
proposed standard is that when it initially entered the Australian market, plain 
packaging legislation was not reasonably predictable, even if the likelihood of such 
regulation later became apparent.  Nonetheless, although Philip Morris Australia 
(“PM Australia”), the Australian subsidiary of PM Asia, was incorporated in 
Australia in 1954,140 PM Asia did not formally acquire PM Australia until February 
23, 2011,141 well after the plain packaging legislation had been proposed.142  PM Asia 
could also argue that, because plain packaging legislation was debated for several 
decades without implementation, it reasonably expected that countries would not 
enact such regulations.   Nonetheless, unlike the claimant in Metalclad,143 PM Asia 
received no ostensible assurances from the Australian government that such 
regulations would not occur.  Consequently, while PM Asia may contend that it 
could not have reasonably predicted the plain packaging legislation, its argument is 
significantly weaker than the claimant’s position in Metalclad. 
C.  Preventing the Decline of Investor-State Arbitration 
In April 2011, Australia announced in a Trade Policy Statement that it will no 
longer pursue investor-state dispute resolution clauses in international treaties.144  In 
the Trade Policy Statement, Australia openly alluded to the PM Asia arbitration as a 
catalyst for this policy reform when it stated “[t]he Government has not and will not 
accept [investor-state dispute resolution] provisions that limit its capacity to put 
health warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products.”145   
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If expropriation provisions in BITs continue to, in practice, “confer greater legal 
rights on foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses,”146  other 
nations may follow Australia’s lead, resulting in the overall decline of investor-state 
arbitration.  Consequently, arbitral tribunals should apply a clear, narrow standard 
for determining when indirect expropriation occurs.  This article has proposed such a 
standard by arguing that tribunals should only recognize compensable indirect 
expropriation when a state action completely defeats the profit-making ability of a 
foreign investment and an investor could not reasonably predict the state action.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Arbitral tribunals have struggled to differentiate between non-compensable 
regulation and compensable indirect expropriation.  At present, these tribunals apply 
a wide array of standards to recognize indirect expropriation.  Although tribunals 
generally analyze the effect of the state action on the investor and the purpose of the 
state action, their specific standards vary greatly from case to case.  Given the 
ambiguity of current standards, some scholars have taken a radical approach by 
proposing an end to compensation for indirect expropriation.  Others have looked to 
“fair and equitable treatment” as a viable alternative to expropriation analysis.  
However, these solutions are insufficient because they could fail to recognize 
legitimate indirect expropriation claims. 
This article proposes a uniform standard for identifying indirect expropriation.  
Arbitral tribunals should only find that indirect expropriation occurs when (i) the 
state action completely deprives a foreign investor of the profit-making ability of its 
investment, and (ii) the state action was not reasonably predictable to the investor.  
This standard would remedy much of the ambiguity of current indirect expropriation 
standards.  Furthermore, it could be easily applied to contemporary expropriation 
claims such as the PM Asia arbitration, and it would promote the overall use of 
investor-state arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
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